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How to implement HyGene into ACT-R 
We investigate if and how the model of hypothesis generation and probability 
judgment HyGene can be implemented in ACT-R. We ground our endeavour on 
the formal comparison of the memory theories behind ACT-R and HyGene, 
whereby we contrast the predictions of the two as a function of prior history and 
current context. After demonstrating the convergence of the two memory 
theories, we provide a 3-step guide of how to translate a memory representation 
from HyGene into ACT-R. We also outline how HyGene’s processing steps can 
be translated into ACT-R. We finish with a discussion of points of divergence 
between the two theories. 
Keywords: ACT-R; HyGene; theory comparison; declarative memory 
Introduction 
Imagine that you are a reviewer at an established psychological journal and you are 
faced with the task of evaluating the probability that a manuscript will contribute to 
theory integration. How will you proceed? We are frequently faced with such problems 
of judging probability or likelihood in our daily lives and, consequently, a large amount 
of research has focused on explaining how we make such judgments. This research has 
uncovered many phenomena to be explained (e.g., overconfidence, Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1978) and developed corresponding models to address those phenomena. These models 
include various heuristics from the heuristics-and-biases research program (e.g., 
availability, Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and several ecological approaches (e.g., 
Probabilistic Mental Models, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Brunswikian 
Induction Algorithm for Social Cognition, Fiedler, 1996; see also Fiedler, 2000).  
Among these theories, MINERVA-DM (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999) 
emerged as a potential unifier. It brought together the ecological approaches and a 
theory of memory, MINERVA2 (Hintzman, 1984), and it expanded that theory of 
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memory with a conditional likelihood estimation process to address many findings in 
probability and likelihood judgment. The successor of MINERVA-DM, HyGene 
(Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008) – a model of how people acquire 
information from the environment, generate hypotheses from memory based on this 
information, test those hypotheses and judge the probability of each – is probably the 
most comprehensive theory of probability judgment currently.  
Extensions of HyGene to model the dynamics of data acquisition and hypothesis 
generation 
In its original formulation, HyGene did not address the dynamics of information 
acquisition. Mehlhorn, Taatgen, Lebiere, and Krems (2011) set forth to investigate how 
the dynamics of information acquisition influence the hypothesis generation process. In 
so doing, Mehlhorn et al. (2011) resorted to the cognitive architecture ACT-R 
(Anderson, 2007), which they used to construct 4 models of hypothesis generation. The 
4 models weighted differently each piece of information currently in the focus of 
attention. ACT-R was necessary to the extent that it allowed for, first, modelling the 
information acquisition process, second, modelling differential weighting of items in 
working memory and, third, relating activation of an item in memory to its retrieval 
time. The activation-retrieval-time relation allowed Mehlhorn et al. (2011) to determine 
a hypothesis’s activation via its retrieval time.  
 Lange, Thomas and Davelaar (2012) also set forth to investigate the dynamics of 
information acquisition. In so doing, they extended HyGene to include a dynamic 
working memory store, based on Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, 
and Usher (2005)’s model of cued recall, also in order to model how information 
acquisition dynamics affect hypothesis generation. The dynamic working memory store 
extension of HyGene was demonstrated to account for recency effects in the weighting 
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of evidence in the hypothesis generation process (Lange at al., 2012) and for differential 
weighting of each piece of evidence as a function of duration of presentation during the 
hypothesis generation process (Lange, Davelaar, & Thomas, 2013). Moreover, it was 
shown to be consistent with Mehlhorn et al.’s results. Mehlhorn et al. (2011) and Lange 
et al. (2012) are two successful examples of one formal theory extending the predictions 
of HyGene. 
ACT-R in judgment and decision making 
Mehlhorn et al. (2011) used ACT-R to model information acquisition and hypothesis 
generation. This is just one of many areas of application that this general theory of 
cognition has found. These areas are as diverse as analogy making (Salvucci & Anderson, 
2001), past tense learning (Taatgen & Anderson, 2002), solving the Tower of Hanoi 
puzzle (Anderson & Douglass, 2001), associative recognition (Schneider & Anderson, 
2012) and novice to expert transition in human-computer interaction (Paik, Kim, Ritter, 
& Reitter, 2015). 
 In the field of judgment and decision making specifically, ACT-R has found 
several other applications. Specifically, the memory system of this cognitive 
architecture has been used to investigate the properties of the fluency heuristic 
(Schooler & Hertwig, 2005), to explore the applicability of various decision strategies 
(Marewski & Schooler, 2011) and to model cue ordering in inference (Dimov & Link, 
2017). In addition, the full architecture was used to construct 39 recognition-based 
decision models (Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011) and to develop cue-based decision 
models (Dimov, Marewski, & Schooler, 2013; Fechner et al., 2016; Nellen, 2003).  
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, ACT-R has never been applied to probability and 
likelihood judgments. One way to investigate ACT-R’s applicability to such 
phenomena, which will also avoid a large amount of duplication of effort, is to 
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implement HyGene in ACT-R. Moreover, as Mehlhorn et al. (2011) have exemplified, 
this has the potential to also benefit HyGene itself by enriching its predictions. 
Benefits of implementing all of HyGene in ACT-R  
ACT-R can enrich HyGene’s predictions in three ways. First, ACT-R’s retrieval 
equations provide predictions about both retrieval outcome and retrieval latency, 
whereas HyGene does not currently model latencies. Second, ACT-R includes 
perceptual and motor components with associated latency parameters, which 
complement the central cognitive components, thus allowing one to model the full 
process that an experimental subject undergoes, starting from observing a stimulus on 
the screen and finishing with a key press on a keyboard. As a result, an ACT-R model 
can predict absolute response times instead of relative response times and include 
information acquisition constraints present in the perceptual components and response 
constraints present in the motor components. Third, ACT-R has established module-to-
brain mappings (e.g., Borst & Anderson, 2015a), which have been used to test models 
of relatively simple (Anderson, Qin, Sohn, Stenger, & Carter, 2003) and complex tasks 
(Anderson, Fincham, Schneider, & Yang, 2012) with fMRI, and to test models with 
EEG (Borst & Anderson, 2015b) and with MEG (Borst, Ghuman, & Anderson, 2016). 
Together, the richer predictions that ACT-R brings can allow researchers to develop 
models of hypothesis generation and judgment, which can be scrutinized both with 
outcome data and with, behavioural and neural, process data.  
Outline 
Our goal is to investigate if and how HyGene can be mapped onto ACT-R. We will start 
by introducing the two theories and by describing in detail the equations guiding their 
memory representations. We will then compare the predictions derived from those 
equations as a function of prior history and current context, and provide a 3-step guide 
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of how to relate the memory representations of the two theories. We will finish with 
outlining how HyGene’s processing steps can be implemented in ACT-R and discuss 
limits to our approach. 
 
The cognitive architecture ACT-R 
Overview 
ACT-R combines theories of perception, motor action and central aspects of cognition 
into a unified framework, which is implemented as a computer program. In ACT-R, 
each cognitive function is realized as a separate cognitive module. This cognitive 
architecture interacts with the environment through perceptual modules (an aural and a 
visual module) and motor modules (a vocal and a manual module). In addition, it has 
modules modelling central aspects of cognition: An intentional module tracks the 
current goal, a declarative module models information storage and retrieval, and an 
imaginal module stores task-relevant information. Finally, a timing module models 
prospective time perception by tracking the number of ticks that an internal accumulator 
generates during the interval being timed. 
The modules’ contents cannot be accessed directly, but only through 
communication channels with limited capacity, called buffers. Information in those 
buffers can only be accessed and moved around by the procedural module, which is 
instantiated as a central production system. This production system consists of if-then 
rules, or production rules, which attempt to match the current state of the buffers and, in 
case of a match, execute a change in the modules’ state. Such a change might be, for 
example, a retrieval request in the case of the declarative module or a command to 
move a finger in case of the manual module. 
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Productions are the representation of choice for procedural knowledge 
(knowledge of how to do something). Declarative knowledge (knowledge of facts and 
experiences) in ACT-R is represented as chunks. A chunk consists of a set of slots with 
associated values (see Figure 1 for an example of a chunk with three slots). In ACT-R, 
all factual knowledge and experience is modelled as a collection of chunks and is stored 
in a single declarative memory storage. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
 Declarative memory is populated by buffer clearing: Each time the contents of a 
buffer is cleared, it is either stored as a new chunk or, if the chunk is already present in 
declarative memory, it reinforces the already existing chunk, increasing its activation. 
Chunk activation quantifies the strength of a piece of memory and determines retrieval 
dynamics, such as response time or recall probability: The higher the activation, the 
more likely a fact is retrieved and, in case of a retrieval, the faster it is retrieved.   
ACT-R also has a mechanism for retrieving an aggregate result of a set of 
chunks, called blending (Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003, Appendix A). Unlike 
retrieving a specific chunk, blending weights chunks as a function of their activation 
and produces a weighted average value of a quantity of interest. This process can be 
used, for example, to produce continuous value estimates.  
ACT-R’s declarative memory  
Here we will describe in detail the subsymbolic equations governing chunk activations, 
and consequently, retrieval and blending. Chunk activation Ai is modelled as a function 
of prior exposure (base-level activation, Bi), context relevance (spreading activation, 
SAi), similarity to retrieval request (partial matching, PMi) and noise:  
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  𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝑃𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀 = 𝐵𝑖 + ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑗 + 𝑃 ∑ 𝑀𝑙𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀.  (1)  
 Base-level activation Bi reflects how recently and how frequently the event or 
fact represented by chunk i was encountered in the past. The equation describing 
learning through base-level activation is:  
    𝐵𝑖 = ln ∑ 𝑡𝑗
−𝑑𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1 ,     (2) 
where ni is the number of presentations of an item represented by chunk i, tj is the time 
since the jth presentation, and d is the decay parameter. The decay parameter determines 
how quickly memories decay in time. According to the base-level equation, each time 
an item is presented, the activation of the chunk representing it increases. Then, with 
time, its activation decays according to a power function. An approximation of the base-
level equation, which assumes that the object/event represented by the chunk is 
encountered periodically, is the optimized learning equation1: 
  𝐵𝑖 = ln [
𝑇𝐿𝑖
−𝑑
1−𝑑
𝑛𝑖] = ln 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑑 ln 𝑇𝐿𝑖 − ln 1 − 𝑑.  (3) 
Aside from being simpler to calculate, optimized learning conveniently separates a 
chunk’s base-level activation into two components: a number of presentations ni and 
lifetime TLi (time since the chunk was first created). This conceptual separation will 
later come to use when comparing HyGene and ACT-R. 
 Context effects typically originate from the chunk currently placed in the 
imaginal buffer. This chunk spreads activation SAi to chunk i in declarative memory as 
a function of the number of slots these two chunks have in common. Specifically, in 
Equation 1, Wj is the total amount of activation from source j (e.g., from the imaginal 
buffer), while Sji is the strength of association from source j (e.g., a slot currently in the 
imaginal buffer) to chunk i. Sji is 0 if chunk j is not the value of a slot of chunk i (also, j 
9 
 
and i should not be the same chunk). If the two chunks have common slots, the 
association strength is set using the following equation:  
    𝑆𝑗𝑖 = 𝑆 + ln[𝑃(𝑖|𝑗)].     (4) 
In this equation, S is the maximum associative strength and P(i|j) is conditional 
probability of encountering chunk i, given that chunk j is present.  This probability 
equals 1 if i and j are the same, meaning that each chunk is maximally associated to 
itself.  
 The partial matching mechanism allows for chunks to be retrieved, which do not 
correspond exactly to the retrieval request. Upon retrieval, all slots of the retrieval 
request are taken into consideration. Each chunk’s activation changes as a function of 
the similarity between its slot values and the slot values from the retrieval request: In 
Equation 1, P is the weight given to each slot within the retrieval request, while Mli is 
the degree of similarity between slot value l in the retrieval request and corresponding 
slot value in chunk i in declarative memory.  
 Finally, the noise component ε consists of permanent noise and instantaneous 
noise computed at the time of a retrieval request. We will only consider instantaneous 
noise below. Instantaneous noise is drawn from a logistic distribution with a location 
𝜇 = 0. 
 It is important to emphasize that the various observables determined by the 
declarative system are not linearly related to activation. Instead, probability of 
successful retrieval, probability of retrieving one chunk among several matching 
chunks, weight in blending, and retrieval latency are all exponentially related to 
activation. Specifically, the probability of retrieving a chunk, given a retrieval threshold 
τ, is: 
     𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 =
1
1+𝑒
−
𝐴𝑖−𝜏
𝑠
 ,    (5) 
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where s is the scale parameter of the logistic distribution of ε and τ is the retrieval 
threshold, which specifies the minimum activation required for a retrieval to succeed. In 
addition, if activations are sufficiently above threshold, such that retrieval failure is 
highly unlikely, the probability of selecting one among several chunks is described by 
the Boltzmann selection rule: 
      𝑃𝑖 =
𝑒
𝐴𝑖
𝑠⁄
∑ 𝑒
𝐴𝑗
𝑠⁄𝑗
 .     (6) 
Finally, retrieval time decreases exponentially as activation increases: 
      𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝐴𝑖 .    (7) 
 Activation determines both retrieval of a specific chunk and the contribution of 
that chunk to the blending process. Specifically, the analogue of activation for the 
blended chunk (the so-called match-score M) equals: 
     𝑀 = log ∑ 𝑒𝐴𝑖𝑖∈𝑀𝑆 ,     (8) 
where the summation is over the match set MS. The match score is in essence the sum 
of activations of all chunks included in the blending process. Just like for retrieval, 
observables are related to the exponent of the match score. As a consequence, all 
observables related to the match score are based on the sum of exponents of the blended 
chunks’ activations:  
     𝑒𝑀 = ∑ 𝑒𝐴𝑖𝑖∈𝑀𝑆 .     (9) 
 
HyGene 
Overview 
HyGene describes how people generate hypotheses and judge the probability of those 
hypotheses. It extends MINERVA-DM by adding semantic memory and working 
memory storages to its episodic memory storage. Both semantic memory and episodic 
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memory store memory traces as feature lists. Episodic memory stores traces based on 
direct experience, while semantic memory stores information abstracted from episodic 
memory or obtained outside of direct experience. The episodic storage can contain 
multiple equivalent traces, one for each encounter with an item or an event, and is thus 
sensitive to experiential base rates. Semantic memory does not contain such frequency 
information – it is in essence a list of prototypes. Finally, working memory temporarily 
stores a limited number of traces.  
MINERVA2: HyGene’s episodic memory 
The theory describing HyGene’s episodic memory is MINERVA2. It represents stimuli 
as feature lists, or vectors, which, upon encoding, are stored as episodic traces in 
memory. Features in MINERVA2 are assumed to be binary with values 1 or -1, if 
present, or 0 if there is no knowledge of that feature (see Figure 2 for an example of a 
vector with 12 features).  
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
 Encoding in MINERVA2 is a noisy process, resulting in imperfect copies of the 
experienced events in episodic memory. This process is governed by a learning rate 
parameter L, which describes the probability of storing a value: With a probability of L 
a feature value is correctly stored as either 1 or -1, while with a probability of 1-L 
nothing gets stored (a value of 0). Features with values of 0 can also occur if they are 
irrelevant to the task. 
According to MINERVA2, during retrieval all episodic traces are matched in 
parallel against a retrieval probe. In so doing, they produce a cumulative output called 
an echo. In the echo, each trace i is weighted by its activation AM,i. Activation in 
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MINERVA2 is a function of the similarity SM,i of a trace to the retrieval probe. 
Similarity increases as the number of matching features increases: 
    𝑆𝑀,𝑖 = ∑
𝑃𝑗𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1  
2,    (10) 
where Pj is the value of feature j of the probe, Ti,j is the value of feature j of trace i and 
Ni is the number of features relevant for the comparison (i.e., the summation takes place 
over all non-zero feature values). The resulting quantity lies between -1 and 1, where it 
equals -1 if the probe and trace are maximally different, and 1 if the probe and trace are 
the same. 
 The degree to which a trace is activated is a cubic function of its similarity to the 
probe: 
    𝐴𝑀,𝑖 = 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
3 = (
2𝑘−1
𝑁𝑖
)
3
 ,   (11) 
where k is the number of matching features. The activations of all traces in memory are 
summed to compute the final echo intensity: 
    𝐼 = ∑ 𝐴𝑀,𝑖
𝐾
𝑖=1 ,     (12) 
where K is the number of traces in long-term memory. The consequence of Equation 11 
and Equation 12 is that traces more similar to the probe echo more strongly. Because 
activation is a superlinear (or what Hintzman, 1988, calls “positive accelerated”, p. 529) 
function of similarity, the more similar traces contribute much more to the echo. In 
MINERVA2, observables, such as recognition probability or frequency judgments, are 
linearly related to the echo intensity, and thus, to each trace’s activation. 
HyGene’s hypothesis generation and testing process 
To generate hypotheses and make probably judgments, HyGene assumes a six-step 
process. In a first step, data is sampled from the environment, which activates traces in 
episodic memory as a function of their similarity to the data (see Equation 10). Second, 
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episodic traces are merged into a single unspecified probe, whereby each contributes as 
a function of its activation (see Equation 11). The unspecified probe represents those 
hypotheses in episodic memory related to the data. Third, to determine what the 
unspecified probe represents, it is matched against hypotheses in semantic memory, 
whereby the similarity between hypotheses and the unspecified probe is computed 
according to Equation 10. Fourth, hypotheses are generated sequentially. The 
probability that a hypothesis is sampled is determined by its activation relative to the 
activation of all hypotheses in semantic memory, following Luce’s choice axiom. If the 
generated hypothesis is sufficiently active, it is placed in working memory. Working 
memory stores a limited number of hypotheses. The hypotheses currently entertained in 
working memory are called the set of leading contender hypotheses, or SOC. These 
represents the decision maker’s best explanations of the data. Fifth, the probability of 
each hypothesis in SOC is estimated by matching this hypothesis to episodic memory 
and comparing its echo intensity (see Equation 12) to the sum of echo intensities of all 
hypotheses: 
    𝑃(𝐻𝑖|𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠) =
𝐼𝑖
∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑗∈𝑆𝑂𝐶
    (13) 
Equation 13 leads to the property of constrained additivity: The judged probability of 
the explicitly considered hypotheses is additive. A consequence of constrained 
additivity is that if the number of number of hypotheses is larger than the explicitly 
considered hypotheses, judgment will be subadditive. Sixth and last, HyGene models 
can engage in a hypothesis-guided search in memory. We will not consider this last step 
in this work. 
 
A comparison of ACT-R’s declarative memory and MINERVA2 
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MINERVA2 is the foundation for each of HyGene’s steps. If we want to implement 
HyGene in ACT-R, it is necessary to determine if ACT-R can mimic MINERVA2. To 
this end, we will compare the predictions of the two memory theories as a function of 
prior history and context. When considering prior history, we will keep context effects 
(i.e., similarity in MINERVA2, and spreading activation and partial matching in ACT-
R) constant. When considering context, we will keep prior history effects (i.e., number 
of presentations in both theories, learning rate in MINERVA2 and lifetime in ACT-R) 
constant. For ACT-R, we will always use the exponent of chunk activation, because all 
observables are related to it, while for MINERVA2, we will use trace activation 
directly. 
Prior history 
Presentation frequency  
MINERVA2 encodes each observation as a separate trace. When memory is probed, 
each trace in memory contributes with a certain activation to the echo intensity and 
content, as given by Equation 11. Thus, if an item occurred n times and its similarity to 
the probe is fixed to SM, we will have a total activation of the traces related to that item 
of AM
tot = nAM = nSM
3. That is, the relative total activation of all traces related to two 
items with the same similarity to the probe is proportional to the relative occurrence 
frequencies of those items:  
     
𝐴𝑀,1
𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐴𝑀,2
𝑡𝑜𝑡 =
𝑛1𝑆𝑀
3
𝑛2𝑆𝑀
3 =
𝑛1
𝑛2
.     (14)  
 To make the equivalent comparison in ACT-R, we will assume that the chunks 
representing the two items have the same lifetime TL. In this case, the relative 
exponentiated activation of two chunks is:  
  
𝑒𝐴1
𝑒𝐴2
= 𝑒𝐴1−𝐴2 = 𝑒𝐵1−𝐵2 = 𝑒
ln[
𝑇𝐿
−𝑑(1−𝑑)𝑛1
𝑇𝐿
−𝑑(1−𝑑)𝑛2
]
= 𝑒
ln[
𝑛1
𝑛2
]
=
𝑛1
𝑛2
 .  (15)  
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Thus, MINERVA2 and ACT-R converge in their encoding of frequency. It is important 
to emphasize that this result holds only for chunks with the same lifetime TL, as is the 
case in many experiments and for some real-world events and objects. When the chunks 
have different lifetimes, however, the predictions of the two theories will diverge.  
Constant difference in presentation frequency 
While both theories preserve presentation frequency in activation, what happens when 
we increase the presentation frequency of two items, while keeping the difference in 
presentation frequency between the two constant? The typical empirical finding is that 
the chance of committing an error in such a relative frequency judgment task increases 
with presentation frequency (see Hintzman, 1988).  
 MINERVA2 explains relative frequency-judgment effects through the learning 
rate L. Specifically, imperfect encoding (i.e., L < 1) leads to a higher variability of echo 
intensity as the number of presentations of an item increases. This variability is 
between-subjects: Each subject encodes a different set of features for the same item, 
which leads to different values of echo intensity among subjects when that item is later 
presented as a probe. This higher variability then increases the probability of a less 
frequently presented item to have a higher activation than a more frequently presented 
item as presentation frequency increases (see Hintzman, 1988). 
 ACT-R can account for relative frequency judgments, because chunk activation 
is a random variable. Specifically, assuming that the difference in presentation 
frequency ∆n is kept constant (i.e., n1=n2+∆n) and that context effects are constant, the 
activation difference becomes: 
  𝐴1 − 𝐴2 = ln 𝑛1 − ln 𝑛2 + 𝜀1−𝜀2 = ln
𝑛2+∆𝑛
𝑛2
+ 𝜀1−𝜀2 
      = ln
𝑛2+∆𝑛
𝑛2
+ 𝜀̂.       (16) 
In the limit, the difference between A1 and A2 goes to 0: 
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  lim
𝑛2→∞
𝐴1 − 𝐴2 = lim
𝑛2→∞
[ln
𝑛2+∆𝑛
𝑛2
+ 𝜀̂] = ln 1 + 𝜀̂ = 0 + 𝜀̂.   (17) 
In other words, the two activation distributions overlap more as presentation frequency 
increases and the difference in presentation frequency is kept constant, because 
activation noise is independent of presentation frequency and activation is logarithmic 
with presentation frequency. This results in noise overtaking the effects on any 
observable as the number of presentations increases: 
   lim
𝑛2→∞
𝑒𝐴1
𝑒𝐴2
= 𝑒𝐴1−𝐴2 = 𝑒0+?̂? = 𝑒 ?̂?.     (18) 
To summarize, to account for an increase in error rate in a relative frequency judgment 
task, MINERVA2 assumes between subject variability due to encoding, while ACT-R 
assumes that retrieval is an inherently noisy process.  
Memory decay 
When considering base-level activation in the previous two sections, we assumed that 
the lifetimes of the two chunks under consideration are the same and that the learning 
rate stays constant over vectors. Under these assumptions, memory decay does not 
affect relative activation of chunks. When there is considerable departure from this 
assumption, one can plug in the actual chunk lifetimes to estimate their relative 
activation. For example, let us assume that one chunk is x times older than another. That 
is, we assume that TL1 = xTL2. Let us also take the default value
3 of the decay parameter 
d = 0.5. Given these assumptions, the relative activation of the two chunks will be:  
 𝑒𝐵1−𝐵2 = 𝑒
ln[
𝑇𝐿1
−𝑑(1−𝑑)𝑛1
𝑇𝐿2
−𝑑(1−𝑑)𝑛2
]
= 𝑒
ln[
(𝑥𝑇𝐿2)
−0.5(1−𝑑)𝑛1
𝑇𝐿2
−0.5(1−𝑑)𝑛2
]
= 𝑒
ln[
𝑛1
√𝑥𝑛2
]
=
𝑛1
√𝑥𝑛2
.  (19)  
This means that the relative activation of the younger chunk will be boosted √𝑥 times 
compared to that of the older chunk. For example, if chunk 1 was presented once 9 
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hours ago, while chunk 2 was presented once 1 hours ago, the latter will have a 3 times 
larger activation. 
 This departure from linear encoding of frequency of chunks with different 
lifetimes is a prediction that MINERVA2 does not incorporate, because MINERVA2 
does not directly model memory decay. Instead, memory decay can be engineered by 
varying the learning rate L (see Hintzman, 1988). Decreasing the learning rate is 
equivalent to modelling forgetting of feature values, which decreases the similarity 
between probe and vector. This leads to the vector being less activated than it would be 
with a higher learning rate. The drawback of this “engineered” solution, compared to 
ACT-R’s “built-in” memory decay, is that the rate of decay remains unconstrained.  
Effects of current context 
Context effects in MINERVA2 are modelled through the similarity between a retrieval 
probe and a memory trace. Specifically, according to MINERVA2, a vector’s activation 
changes as the cube of the number of matching feature values between probe and the 
memory vector (see Equation 10 and Equation 11). Figure 3 depicts this cubic 
relationship between similarity and activation. In practice, we do not expect activation 
to cover the full range between -1 and 1. This is because we expect two unrelated 
vectors to differ on half of their non-zero features and to match on the other half, which 
results in a similarity of 0 (see Hintzman, 1988). Thus, vectors unrelated to the probe 
contribute around 0 activation to the echo intensity, while related vectors contribute 
superlinearly to their similarity with the probe. The resulting expected operative range 
of the similarity-activation curve lies within the unshaded region of Figure 3.  
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
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 We will now consider the two mechanisms in ACT-R, through which such 
context effects can be modelled: partial matching and spreading activation. Partial 
matching is directly equivalent to MINERVA2’s matching of probe and memory 
vectors, because it assesses the degree of similarity between a retrieval probe and a 
chunk in declarative memory. Spreading activation, on the other hand, takes place 
independent of the retrieval request.  
Partial matching 
The partial matching mechanism allows for retrieving chunks, whose values do not 
exactly correspond to the retrieval request, but are instead similar to it. According to 
Equation 1, the contribution of partial matching to activation is a function of the similarity 
Mli of slot l in the retrieval request to the slots of chunk i in memory. One way to translate 
vector similarities to chunk similarities is to assume that all chunks have only one slot, as 
is shown on Figure 4. In this case, the entire trace in MINERVA2 is represented by this 
single slot. The slot value from the retrieval probe is then matched against the single slot 
values of chunks in declarative memory.  
 
[Figure 4 near here] 
 
  To mimic context effects from MINERVA2 onto ACT-R, we need to equalize 
the contribution of partial matching in a chunk’s (exponentiated) activation to the 
contribution of similarity in a trace. Assuming equal prior histories, this would amount 
to the following condition: 
     𝑒𝑃𝑀𝑖 = 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
3 .      (20) 
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Note that in Equation 20, we have dropped the index l, because our chunks have only a 
single slot. The resulting value of a chunk’s similarity to the retrieval request, given SM,i 
and a constant mismatch penalty P, equals: 
     𝑀𝑖 =
3 ln 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
𝑃
=
3
𝑃
ln (
2𝑘−1
𝑁𝑖
).    (21) 
 A second way to translate vector similarities to chunk similarities relies on the 
assumption that there are as many slots in chunks as non-zero features in vectors, as is 
depicted in Figure 5. This amounts to the following condition:  
     𝑒𝑃 ∑ 𝑀𝑙𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑙=1 = 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
3 ,     (22) 
where the summation is over all non-zero features Ni. Given the assumptions that the 
similarity between slots with the same value (i.e., 1 & 1 or -1 & -1) is constant and 
equal to Mi, and that the similarity between slots with differing values is 0, the 
similarity equals: 
     𝑀𝑖 =
3 ln 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
𝑃𝑘
=
3
𝑃𝑘
ln (
2𝑘−1
𝑁𝑖
).    (23) 
 
[Figure 5 near here] 
 
 A third and final way to translate vector similarities to chunk similarities 
assumes that a chunk has several slots and each slot is mapped to an equal part of a 
trace. For example, Figure 6 depicts a case, in which a 12-feature vector is mapped onto 
a chunk with 3 slots, whereby each slot accommodates 4 features. This way of 
translating vector similarity to chunk similarity is a generalization of the previous two 
cases. Under this assumption, the relationship between the two quantities is: 
     𝑒𝑃 ∑ 𝑀𝑙𝑖
𝑚
𝑙=1 = 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
3 ,    (24) 
where m is the number of slots in a chunk. 
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[Figure 6 near here] 
 
To determine the similarities Mli we can again assume that each matching feature value 
pair (e.g., 1 & 1 or -1 & -1) contributes the same amount Mi to similarity. Mi is again 
given by Equation 23. Computing Mli amounts to multiplying Mi by the number of 
matching feature values for slot l. Note that Equation 21 and Equation 23 are only 
defined when at least half of the feature values match.  
Spreading activation 
The second mechanism to model context effects in ACT-R is spreading activation. A 
chunk in the imaginal buffer spreads activation to chunks in memory if the latter have 
slots in common with the former. Irrespective of their similarity, slots of chunks in 
declarative memory, whose values are not present in the imaginal buffer, do not receive 
any spreading activation. Because of this binary nature of spreading activation, we will 
assume that each feature in MINERVA2 corresponds to a slot in a chunk, as in Figure 5. 
For simplicity, we will assume that Wj = 1 and that P(i|j) = p for all i and j, between 
which activation is spread. In this case, the spreading activation equation reduces to: 
   𝑆𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑗{S + ln[𝑃(𝑖|𝑗)]}𝑗 = ∑ {𝑆 + ln[𝑝]}𝑗 .   (25)  
To mimic context effects, we need to set the contribution of spreading activation in a 
chunk’s (exponentiated) activation equal to the contribution of similarity in a trace. The 
exponent of spreading activation is a power function of the number of matching slots k: 
     𝑒𝑆𝐴𝑖 = (𝑝𝑒𝑆)𝑘 .    (26) 
Both ACT-R’s (Equation 26) and MINERVA2’s (Equation 11) expressions are 
superlinear functions of the number of matching slots k, albeit with different functional 
forms. To demonstrate the close match between the two, Figure 7 plots ACT-R’s 
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functional form for a base of 1.5 (i.e., peS=1.5) next to the operative range of 
MINERVA2’s similarity/activation relationship.  
 
[Figure 7 near here] 
 
Equating exponentiated spreading activation to a trace’s activation is equivalent to the 
following condition: 
     𝑒𝑆𝐴𝑖 = (𝑝𝑒𝑆)𝑘 = 𝑆𝑀,𝑖
3 = (
2𝑘−1
𝑁𝑖
)
3
 .   (27) 
This equation can be solved given a number of matching feature values k by fixing 
either p or S. Alternatively, one can fit a power function, which mimics a cubic 
function, to arrive at a solution independent of the value of k (e.g., as in Figure 7). 
A 3-step guide for translating episodic traces to chunks  
The results above demonstrate that the predictions made by ACT-R’s declarative 
memory and those made by MINERVA2 strongly correspond and that ACT-R can 
mimic the predictions by MINERVA2. Based on these results, we will provide a 3-step 
guide of how to translate MINERVA2’s vectors to ACT-R’s chunks. In step 3, one can 
model context effects through either partial matching or spreading activation. 
 Step 1: Identify unique episodic traces. Create separate chunks for each unique 
episodic trace. 
 Step 2: Count the number of instances of each unique episodic trace and set 
base-level activation of the corresponding chunk to B=c+ln(n), where c is any constant. 
 Step 3a: Compute the similarity between slots by counting the number of 
features upon which probe and traces disagree and then applying Equation 21 or 
Equation 23, depending on the representation chosen. 
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 Step 3b: Assume that each feature in MINERVA2 is represented by a separate 
chunk slot and determine the values of p and S in Equation 27 through fitting. 
 
Translating HyGene’s processes 
In what follows, we will briefly outline how HyGene’s processing steps can be realized 
in ACT-R. The description is enabled by the demonstrated correspondence between the 
two memory theories. We will trace the processing steps in the same order as presented 
in HyGene’s introduction. 
Sampling data from the environment 
As already mentioned, ACT-R has modules modelling perception. It is thus able to 
model data acquisition dynamics in various experimental conditions. Generally, data 
acquisition will consist of sequentially encoding observations through one of the 
perceptual modules. Each observation will be stored in the imaginal buffer after it is 
encoded. While the data acquisition details will vary from task to task, the final stage of 
this process will result in a chunk in the imaginal buffer that contains the acquired data.  
Extraction of an unspecified probe 
Once the data is placed in the imaginal buffer, an unspecified probe is constructed via 
blending. In blending, each chunk contributes as a function of its activation. We have 
demonstrated how activation in MINERVA2 can be mapped onto activation in ACT-R. 
If one follows our guideline, the result of blending will be equal to the echo. The 
unspecified probe, now a blended chunk, will then be placed in the imaginal buffer. 
Matching the unspecified probe against hypotheses 
Once the unspecified probe chunk is in the imaginal buffer, it will activate hypothesis 
chunks in declarative memory. We have demonstrated that vector-vector similarity can 
be modelled with either partial matching (Equation 23) or spreading activation 
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(Equation 27). Whichever mechanism is chosen, the activation of hypotheses in 
memory will be equivalent to that by HyGene. 
Hypotheses generation 
In HyGene, the probability of selecting a hypothesis is determined via Luce’s choice 
axiom, that is, it is directly proportional to that hypothesis’s activation. In ACT-R, if 
hypotheses are sufficiently above threshold, which hypothesis is retrieved is determined 
by Boltzmann selection rule (Equation 6), which is proportional to the exponent of 
hypotheses’ activations. The Boltzmann selection rule differs from Luce’s choice axiom 
in that the quantities input are exponentiated. Because ACT-R’s exponentiated 
activation plays the same role as MINERVA2’s activation, hypothesis retrieval will be 
equivalent for the two theories.  
 Once a hypothesis is retrieved, it must be decided if it will be stored in memory 
or not. In HyGene, whether a hypothesis is stored in working memory or not is 
determined by its activation relative to the activations of hypotheses currently in 
working memory. ACT-R does not allow the cognitive agent direct access to chunk 
activation. However, through its timing module, it can track the subjective time through 
the number of ticks accumulated during the retrieval of each hypothesis: Hypotheses 
with higher activations will be retrieved faster than hypotheses with lower activations. 
The number of ticks can then be used to determine whether a hypothesis is stored in the 
SOC or not. 
 The SOC itself is modelled as a chunk in the imaginal buffer, whose slots store 
the currently entertained hypotheses. Populating the SOC will entail three steps. In step 
1, the unspecified probe is retrieved. In step 2, a hypothesis is retrieved, as determined 
by Equation 6, and its retrieval time tracked with the timing module. This hypothesis is 
then stored in the imaginal buffer together with its subjective retrieval time. In step 3, 
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the SOC chunk is retrieved and the hypothesis in the imaginal buffer can be added to 
the SOC chunk. The model will cycle between these three steps until the SOC is 
populated. 
Hypotheses evaluation 
Once generation has ceased, the SOC chunk is in the imaginal buffer. Each hypothesis 
in SOC is evaluated via blending. The exponents of the match score of the blended 
chunk for each hypothesis, following Equation 9, equals the sum of exponents of all 
chunk activations, making it equivalent to the echo intensity. If one were to access the 
match score related to each hypothesis, one would follow Equation 13 to judge the 
probability of each hypothesis and the result will be the same as in HyGene. Moreover, 
the judged probabilities would be also additive for the explicitly considered hypotheses 
and subadditive when the number of hypothesis exceeds working memory capacity. 
 
Discussion 
We have outlined how HyGene can be implemented in ACT-R. We started by 
investigating the compatibility of the memory theory behind ACT-R and MINERVA2, 
the episodic memory theory behind HyGene. At first sight, the two memory theories 
seem different: ACT-R uses the notion of a memory chunk with slots, while 
MINERVA2 uses vectors with binary feature values; Chunks use a single internal 
representation of an external event/object, whose memory strength increases upon 
repeated encounters or recalls, while vectors are stored anew upon each encounter. 
Moreover, ACT-R explicitly models memory decay, while MINERVA2 introduces 
imperfections in memory records through a noisy encoding process. Finally, context 
effects in MINERVA2 are a function of the number of matching features between probe 
and memory trace, while ACT-R assumes two possible mechanisms. Given these 
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differences, it is not obvious at which points these two theories will be tangential to 
each other.  
 Our results show that, both as a function of prior history and current context, the 
theories can make similar predictions. We have specified the conditions under which the 
predictions of these two theories correspond and when they differ. We have also 
provided a 3-step guide of how to translate MINERVA2’s feature lists to ACT-R’s 
chunks so that they make identical predictions. 
 Finally, we outlined how each of HyGene’s steps can be modelled with ACT-R. 
Given that each step relies on the equations behind MINERVA2, it was essential that 
we outlined how to map MINERVA2’s vectors to ACT-R’s chunks. We will now 
discuss four points of departure of the two theories. First, we will discuss how ACT-R 
could access subsymbolic values, necessary in the hypothesis evaluation process. 
Second, we will opine on where a feature vector lies according to ACT-R’s 
terminology. Third, we will discuss the address in functional form behind the equations 
of the two theories. Finally, we will comment on the necessity of separate semantic and 
episodic memory storages. 
Access to subsymbolic values 
In its current formulation, ACT-R does not allow symbolic processes to access 
subsybmolic values. Therefore, even though the total amount of activation of chunks in 
declarative memory (i.e., the match score from the blending process) is proportional to 
the amount of echo, there is no direct way for the model to access these values. Access 
to the match score of the blended chunk is necessary for the probability judgment of 
each hypothesis. Therefore, for ACT-R to judge the probability of each hypothesis, it 
should include a mechanism to either directly or indirectly access these subsybmolic 
values. A direct access to subsymbolic values would require modifying ACT-R to allow 
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access to memory activations. Note that this path has been taken by the Source of 
Activation Confusion model of memory (e.g., Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006), a 
model strongly related to ACT-R’s declarative memory. An indirect access to 
subsymbolic values might rely on a prestored mapping of ticks, from the timing module, 
to probability estimates.  
Representation 
According to ACT-R, chunks and their slots lie at the symbolic level while the 
equations which determine chunk dynamics belong to the subsymbolic level. On the 
other hand, in MINERVA2 the feature values are directly used to compute activation 
and therefore to determine retrieval dynamics. This means that feature values serve a 
role similar to chunk activation and suggests that, in ACT-R’s terminology, 
MINERVA2’s vectors occupy the subsymbolic level. Consequently, the various 
possible mappings of memory traces to chunks, such as those depicted in Figures 4, 5 
and 6, are alternative subsymbolic representational implementing to ACT-R’s 
subsymbolic equations.  
Functional forms 
As a function of prior history, MINERVA2’s mechanism is more flexible than that of 
ACT-R due to the unconstrained nature of MINERVA2’s learning rate parameter. In 
essence, one can choose any value of L to model forgetting through time, which would 
result in an arbitrary forgetting functional form and rate. Meanwhile, ACT-R’s memory 
decay rate has been experimentally constrained (Anderson, Fincham, & Douglass, 
1999). 
 One the other hand, when considering context effects, ACT-R’s functional form 
is more flexible for two reasons. First, similarity Mli is generally unconstrained 
(although, in practice, meaningful values are chosen). Second spreading activation’s 
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functional form, a power function, is more flexible than the cubic function in 
MINERVA2. However, the cubic functional form, while more constrained, is not 
strongly justified. Instead, its purpose is to allow “those items in memory that are most 
similar to the test probe to dominate the overall echo from secondary memory, while 
preserving the sign” (Dougherty et al., 1999, p. 183). Thus, any function which 
increases sufficiently steeply, such as a power function, will provide the required effect.   
Separate long-term memory storages 
HyGene assumes three memory storages: working memory, episodic memory and 
semantic memory. While ACT-R has a storage for task-relevant information analogical 
to working memory (i.e., the imaginal module), it only has a single long-term storage, 
modelled with the declarative module, as opposed to separate episodic and semantic 
storages. Does ACT-R require separate semantic and episodic storages? 
Already since its inception by Tulving, the idea that there are two memory 
compartments has seen opposition (e.g., Anderson & Ross, 1980). In an extensive 
critique, McKoon, Ratcliff, and Dell (1986) offered alternative interpretations of many of 
the pieces of evidence brought forth in support of this dichotomy and, moreover, argued 
that it is impossible to address questions about the existence of two memory storages, 
because the difference between the two is not rendered as a specific theory. Moreover, 
recent memory theories, such as event memory (Rubin & Umanath, 2015), assume or 
argue in favour of a single memory storage. Anderson (2007) has also argued that 
episodic memories only differ from semantic memories “because we can retrieve the 
specific context in which they were learned” and that they “both belong in declarative 
memory” (p. 93). These indicate that a single declarative memory might suffice to model 
the various processes required.  
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Conclusion 
“[B]rand names” tend to make difficult the analysis and comparison of . . . 
mechanisms or the exchange of knowledge between research groups. One can 
argue that it has caused and causes an enormous amount of duplication of effort. 
    Simon, 1998, as cited in Anderson, 2007, p.239 
 
Simon (as cited in Anderson, 2007) criticized the branding of models, because it made 
their mechanism opaque to outsiders, which leads to “an enormous amount of duplication 
of effort” (p.239). Mischel (2008), too, famously paralleled theories in psychology to 
toothbrushes, in that “no self-respecting person wants to use anyone else’s”. Critiques of 
the fragmentedness and inefficiencies of psychological theorizing abound, but we think 
they only tell one side of the story. On the other side lie truly cumulative efforts, among 
which are the two theories that we compared. It is their precise formalism that allowed us 
to compare the predictions of the two theories formally and to find points of agreement 
between the two. With our work, we aimed to make our modest contribution to extending 
the areas of applicability of ACT-R and increasing the amount of detail in HyGene’s 
predictions. More generally, we would like to foster the endeavour of knowledge 
cumulation and theory integration.  
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Footnotes 
1. Dimov (2016) demonstrated that the optimized learning equation is an unbiased 
approximation of the base-level learning equation even when there is some noise in this 
periodicity. Specifically, the noise is allowed to increase superlinearly as a function of the 
number of periods since the event or object encounter. 
2. MINERVA2’s typically uses S as a notation for similarity. Since this overlaps with ACT-R’s 
associative strength, here we will use SM for similarity in MINERVA2. Similarly, we will use 
AM to indicate activation of a trace and keep A as an activation of a chunk in ACT-R. 
3. In ACT-R there are default values for many of the parameters, departure from which is 
discouraged unless justified. 
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